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The Body That Speaks: Recombining
Bodies and Speech Sources in
Unscripted Face-to-Face
Communication
Alex Gillespie* and Kevin Corti
Department of Social Psychology, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
This article examines advances in research methods that enable experimental
substitution of the speaking body in unscripted face-to-face communication. A taxonomy
of six hybrid social agents is presented by combining three types of bodies (mechanical,
virtual, and human) with either an artificial or human speech source. Our contribution
is to introduce and explore the significance of two particular hybrids: (1) the cyranoid
method that enables humans to converse face-to-face through the medium of another
person’s body, and (2) the echoborgmethod that enables artificial intelligence to converse
face-to-face through the medium of a human body. These two methods are distinct
in being able to parse the unique influence of the human body when combined with
various speech sources. We also introduce a new framework for conceptualizing the
body’s role in communication, distinguishing three levels: self’s perspective on the body,
other’s perspective on the body, and self’s perspective of other’s perspective on the
body. Within each level the cyranoid and echoborg methodologies make important
research questions tractable. By conceptualizing and synthesizing these methods, we
outline a novel paradigm of research on the role of the body in unscripted face-to-face
communication.
Keywords: communication, body, cyranoid, echoborg, speech shadowing, android science, experimental
methods, avatar
INTRODUCTION
Before paper, wires, and silicon, the primordial communication medium is the body. At the center of all
communication rests the body, the fleshy gateway to the mind (Biocca, 1997, p. 13)
In face-to-face interaction, words seem inseparable from the bodies that speak them. Consequently,
bodies fundamentally shape the intersubjectivity of social interaction. In human-human
interaction, the age, gender, height, attractiveness, and other physical attributes of the speaking
body mediate the meaning of utterances. For instance, if a young child were to suggest to you how
to pull a country out of an economic recession, how would you react to their proposal compared
to the same suggestions uttered by a scholarly-looking adult? Likewise, with regards to human-
agent interaction, totally different qualities of intersubjectivity can be elicited by the same artificial
intelligence depending on its embodiment. Imagine your different responses to the same chat bot
if you encountered it embodied in a virtual avatar or speaking through a flesh and blood human
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body. Our program of research shows how people’s interactions
with the cognitive content of what is said is profoundly shaped by
the body that speaks.
KEY CONCEPT 1 | The body that speaks
Bodies are any animate medium that can be seen as the agent of
communication. The most obvious bodies are human bodies, which can vary
in terms of age, gender, height, size, attractiveness, and other visible attributes.
Bodies, however, can also be human-like androids, robots, or representations
in virtual reality, all of which can vary on a broader range of visible attributes.
In this article we demonstrate that six ostensibly disparate
research methodologies, from human-computer interaction,
social psychology, and communication, are fundamentally
similar because they all experimentally separate and recombine
speech sources and bodies in unscripted communication
encounters. These methods are distinct because they primarily
focus on animate bodies (as opposed to static or more minimal
mediums, such as pictures and text) and real-time behavior
(as opposed to questionnaire-responses to imagined social
scenarios). Our own contribution has been to advance the
cyranoid and echoborg methodologies (Milgram, 1992; Corti
and Gillespie, 2015a), both of which are unique in their focus
on examining the significance of the fleshy human body in
communication. We then propose three conceptual levels for
parsing the body’s role in face-to-face conversation and at each
level map-out paradigm of research questions that are made
tractable by the cyranoid and echoborg methods.
KEY CONCEPT 2 | Speech source
Speech sources are able to engage in conversation autonomously. Speech
sources can utilize either human or artificial intelligence. Sources vary in terms of
capability, expertise, understanding, emotional intelligence, and so on. Artificial
speech sources include chat bots and even branching scripts, provided that
they are elaborate enough to produce responses within real-time conversation.
MIXING AND MERGING BODIES AND
SPEECH SOURCES
The taken-for-granted assumption that bodies author their own
words is often unwarranted. First, people spend a lot of time
reporting, directly and indirectly, the speech and beliefs of other
people and groups (Bakhtin, 1986; Lucy, 1993; Aveling et al.,
2015). This reported speech can borrow tone, facial expressions,
and non-verbal gestures (Coulmas, 1986). Yet, the reported
speech is also always new, being in a novel context, filled with
distinctive motivation, and translated through a different body.
The point is that much of what is said cannot be attributed to a
solitary individual, rather, it entails hybrid authorship (Wertsch,
1991; Gillespie and Cornish, 2014).Moreover, there are situations
in which the audience is not meant to know, or at least meant
to forget, that the body that speaks is separate from the speech
source: puppets are given voice by the puppeteer, actors speak
words originating from the playwright, television anchors follow
their teleprompter, and politicians ventriloquize the words and
phrases authored by speechwriters. These widespread “mash ups”
of bodies and speech sources, however, are mono-directional;
reported speech, theater scripts, teleprompts, and speeches
cannot adapt to real-time two-way conversation.
A more dynamic mixing and merging of bodies and cognition
sources can be found in traditional beliefs. According to
Hinduism, deities are able to manifest on earth, often as animals,
called avatars. In Japanese folklore, foxes called kitsune, were
thought to be wise and powerful beings capable of taking the
form ofmen and women. Across Europe in the Sixteenth century,
many people believed in werewolves, that is, people who could
shape-shift into dangerous wolves. These beliefs and myths
are powerful, troubling, and fascinating precisely because they
question whether the body that speaks corresponds to the mind
that understands.
Mixing and merging bodies and cognition sources has
been a generative theme in theater, novels, and films. In
Rostand’s (1891/1981) 19th century play Cyrano de Bergerac,
the protagonist woos Roxane by speaking to her through the
more handsome body of Christian. In the novel The Wonderful
Wizard of Oz (Baum, 1900/2000), the seemingly powerful wizard
turns out to be a frail man behind a curtain with a voice
amplifier who had gained authority by speaking through an
imposing and seemingly powerful body. More recently, science
fiction films have further explored the potentials of recombining
bodies and minds. The films Surrogates (Banks et al., 2009) and
Avatar (Kalogridis et al., 2009), for instance, focus on identity,
status, and power transformation made possible by surrogate
bodies, while films such as Being John Malkovich (Kaufman
et al., 1999) have explored the implications of inhabiting another
person’s actual body. Another common theme, inspired by
books such as Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (Dick,
1968), has been whether a seemingly authentic human body that
speaks is in fact guided by artificial intelligence. In each case,
transgressing the audience’s expectation that cognition belongs
solely to the visible body opens up interesting plot lines and
raises philosophical conundrums. Inspired by these themes, we
ask: what research methodologies are available for recombining
bodies and speech sources? And, what research questions can
such methods address?
METHODOLOGIES FOR RECOMBINING
BODIES AND SPEECH SOURCES
We conceptualize three types of body, namely mechanical,
virtual, and human. Each of these bodies can be paired
with two basic types of speech source, namely, human or
artificial. Each of the six resultant combinations corresponds
to a distinctive methodological paradigm (outlined in
Table 1).
Tele-Operated Robots and Androids
The first recombination entails pairing a human speech source
with a mechanical body. Arguably, the earliest variants of
this recombination were puppets (Jurkowski, 1996), notable
amongst them being the original mechanical Turk (Standage,
2002). Technological advancements have enabled controlling
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TABLE 1 | Taxonomy of body and speech source combinations with
associated methods.
Speaking body Speech source Methodological set-up
Mechanical Human Tele-operated robot or android
Mechanical Artificial Autonomous robot or android
Virtual Human Avatar
Virtual Artificial Intelligent virtual agent
Human Human Cyranoid
Human Artificial Echoborg
ever more remote devices, such as submarines, drones, and even
vehicles on other planets. However, it is only fairly recently
that this capacity for long-distance tele-operation has been
combined with two-way communication. For instance, the new
field of android science uses tele-operated androids to merge
human cognition sources with android bodies (MacDorman and
Ishiguro, 2006). Devices known as “Geminoids” (tele-operated
androids modeling specific humans) have been explored as
doppelganger bodies for remote communicators. These devices
involve a human operator controlling their android’s speech and
motor behavior via a remote console that recreates the android’s
audio-visual field. In some cases, tele-operation can be covert
in nature such that the research participant is under the false
impression that they are engaging with an artificial cognition
source, and researchers will often intentionally prime this false
assumption (known as theWizard of Oz technique; Kelley, 1983).
Though in many cases the Wizard of Oz technique is used
in prototyping in order to circumvent limitations in artificial
intelligence, it has also been used as a mechanism to evoke
changes in social interaction.
The social psychological phenomena investigated through the
use of tele-operated devices include concepts such as “presence”
(the subjective sensation of being with another person; Nishio
et al., 2007a) and the “uncanny valley” (Mori, 1970/2012). The
uncanny valley hypothesis asserts that while people’s affinity
toward nonhuman physical bodies generally increases the more
humanlike the body is, positive emotional evaluation will sharply
decline if the body appears too human, yet still artificial. The
concept has spurred speculation into its evolutionary origins (see
Wang et al., 2015), but beyond being psychologically fascinating,
the phenomenon has implications for how the integration of
tele-operated devices in human society will unfold. Developers
of devices intended to function as surrogate bodies in social
interaction will want to optimize the physical attributes of their
products so as to achieve the desired psychological response
from users. It is likely that surrogate mechanical bodies will be
used for office visits (Paulos and Canny, 1997), remote meetings
(Tsui et al., 2011), and care visits (Tsai et al., 2007). As these
technologies become more powerful, they will enable friends and
family to not only visit and communicate with care-receivers,
but also to engage in physical actions such as retrieving objects,
cleaning, or making a meal. The uncanny valley phenomenon
underscores the challenge of building a body that is acceptable
to someone in need of care who is in a significant psychological
relationship with that body (Michaud et al., 2007). What is
clear from this research is that the body that speaks matters
profoundly. For example, should the body be a Geminoid to
facilitate identification, or, as Paulos and Canny (1997) suggest,
should the body be deliberately artificial to avoid any confusion
or mistaken attributions?
Autonomous Robots and Androids
Swapping out the human tele-operator of a machine body for
an artificial cognition source gives us the next species of hybrid:
the fully autonomous android or robot. Though these agents
are not hybrid in the sense of pairing separate artificial and
human entities, they can be conceptualized as such in that they
involve modifiable software (the cognition/speech source) paired
to modifiable hardware (the body), thus allowing researchers to
examine the role of embodiment on social interaction.
Software designed to enable a machine body to socially
interact with a human range from low-level, language
mimicry technology (e.g., chat bots) to high-level forms
of artificial intelligence (Schumaker et al., 2007). Despite
some technologies exhibiting remarkable domain-specific
intelligence (e.g., IBM’s Watson), a general artificial intelligence
capable of allowing a machine body to fluidly replicate the
full spectrum of human cognitive and motor capabilities
remains elusive. As such, fully autonomous androids and
robots are severely socially constrained in unscripted
contextual and dynamic interactions with humans (Nishio
et al., 2007b).
A machine-bodied autonomous entity fully identical to an
organic human in all observable respects with regard to behavior,
appearance, and communicative functioning, would pass what
Harnad (2000) termed the “Total Turing Test” (see Turing, 1950).
The path toward total human mimicry, however, will involve
a series of incremental advancements, with each milestone
bringing with it complex social psychological consequences. For
instance, it remains to be seen whether and how humans will
integrate advanced autonomous entities both psychologically
and socially. These entities may eventually, in time, have an
intelligence that far surpasses human intelligence (Bostrom,
2014), thus becoming psychologically incomprehensible to
humans. These genuinely intelligent devices will likely replace
humans in many occupations, creating the possibility of public
resistance (Bauer, 2014). In such a future context, how these
intelligent agents are embodied may be crucial for public
acceptability.
Avatars
Hybrids composed of virtual bodies (i.e., digital representations
of bodies encountered on computer screens or within virtual
reality environments) combined with human speech sources
are known as avatars and have become increasingly useful
in psychological research aimed at studying how the body
transforms social perception and interaction (Blascovich et al.,
2002). Avatars can range in sophistication (e.g., some are static
representations of bodies while others exhibit complex motor
behavior) and the extent to which they mimic human appearance
(e.g., ranging from representing a specific human body to a
fantastical non-humanoid body). Avatars are not only used
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for research; they are ubiquitous in digital media, providing
playgrounds for identity (Evans, 2011).
One of the more sophisticated and productive methodologies
for exploring social psychological phenomena by-way-of avatars
involves the use of immersive virtual environment technology.
This technology enables research participants to experience pre-
constructed social situations in 3D via an avatar, and affords a
significant degree of mundane realism (Blascovich et al., 2002).
Within an immersive virtual environment, human-stimuli are
not static, imaginary, or implied others, as is often the case
in experimental psychology, but interactive and communicative
others that can be manipulated in terms of outward appearance
and inner disposition.
Consider how immersive virtual environments have been
used to study the social effects of height. Correlational
research had shown that tall people have more self-esteem
and social-esteem, leading to greater career success (Judge
and Cable, 2004). But, if tall people behave differently, how
much of this is due to self-perception and how much is
due to the expectations that others have of them? Yee and
Bailenson (2007) used an immersive virtual environment to
manipulate participants’ self-perception, giving them either tall
or short avatars. After getting accustomed to their virtual
body in a virtual mirror, participants engaged a confederate
(who always saw the same body) in an ultimatum game. The
findings showed that participants who perceived themselves
to be taller were indeed more confident. Yee and Bailenson
(2007) termed this tendency for participants to conform
to the behavior expected from their avatar the “Proteus
Effect.” Identification with one’s avatar can also lead to
stereotype reduction and perspective taking. For instance, Yee
and Bailenson (2006) showed that research participants who
were placed in avatars of older people became less likely
to stereotype elderly people. While the preceding studies
manipulated participants’ self-perception, the paradigm can be
used for more profound interventions in participants’ sensory
processing. For example, using a virtual environment to simulate
the embodied experience of color-blindness led to participants
having increased empathy for people who were color-blind (Ahn
et al., 2013).
Immersive virtual environments and other avatar methods
enable researchers to manipulate the various aspects of self-
perceived and other-perceived identity as well as first-person
sensory experience, and do so in a manner that offers
tight experimental control and high replicability (Blascovich
et al., 2002). Placing research participants in virtual social
scenarios abstracted from real-world situations so as to validate
psychological phenomena bypasses the complications of having
to create these real-world situations in the laboratory or in the
field (e.g., the bystander effect; Kozlov and Johansen, 2010).
So whereas the use of machine-bodied hybrids in psychological
research is limited by technological bottlenecks, social interaction
constraints, and the high costs associated with creating a
physical android or robot (Ziemke and Lindblom, 2006), the
avatar paradigm offers the opportunity to manipulate various
dimensions of the body and surrounding social context in a far
less constrainedmanner, thus offeringmore room for exploratory
research and hypothesis testing. However, while avatar methods
stress the importance of the animate body, they fall short in
offering “actual” presence of a fleshy body that speaks. No
amount of technological sophistication can remove participants’
awareness that a virtual interaction is indeed virtual (Washburn,
2003). It is well established that one of the most powerful
mediators of human behavior is the proximity of an actual
human body, such as an authority source or victim (Milgram,
1974); digital mediation reduces proximity (Dubrovsky et al.,
1991). One need only glace at people’s behavior in online gaming
communities to know that there are things people will do
to and through an avatar that they would never do to and
through an actual human body. Indeed, this fantasy element
is precisely what makes virtual environments appealing (Suler,
2004).
Intelligent Virtual Agents
The virtual analog to the autonomous robot or android is the
intelligent virtual agent (or embodied conversational agent), an
entity that involves an artificial speech and cognition source
paired to a virtual body (Cassell, 2000). These agents are
commercially ubiquitous (e.g., online virtual support agents;
Etemad-Sajadi and Ghachem, 2015), but are also used extensively
in basic and applied social psychological research (e.g., Brave
et al., 2005; Gratch et al., 2007). For instance, intelligent
virtual agents have been used increasingly in the domain
of healthcare training, serving as virtual coaches for trauma
victims (Tielman et al., 2015), mock interviewees for medical
students (Carnell et al., 2015), andmeditation coaches (Shamekhi
and Bickmore, 2015). The intelligent virtual agent literature
consistently underscores the importance of the body in human-
agent intersubjectivity (with the uncanny valley phenomenon
being key). For instance, agents that physically gesture in
a manner associated with an underlying psychological state
suggested by their speech stand a better chance at being
positively evaluated by users (see Guadagno et al., 2011). More
successful agents are those with the capacity to infer a user’s
emotional responses and physically mirror these psychological
states; appropriately doing so in the context of a specific social
situation allows the user to “suspend their disbelief” and engage
the agent in a more fully human manner (de Melo and Gratch,
2015).
Similar to the avatar paradigm, intelligent virtual agent
methodology affords the researcher the ability to create
replicable, highly controlled human stimuli that can be deployed
in cases where real-world stimuli are not conducive or available
for experimentation. For example, virtual agents representative of
various abnormal psychological conditions can provide medical
students with a means of scaffolding their diagnostic acumen
prior to their encountering actual patients (Kenny et al., 2009).
Like with autonomous androids and robots, however, social
interactions under this paradigm are fundamentally constrained
by the limitations of artificial speech systems (even the most
advanced conversational agents cannot fluidly adapt in human-
level conversation). Contemporary intelligent virtual agents
are therefore domain-specific and narrow in their capacity to
socialize beyond strict conversational parameters. Moreover,
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as with avatars, the non-fleshiness of virtual agents presents
limitations in terms of generalizing research findings to real-
world situations involving actual human beings.
Cyranoids
Having one human speak in real-time through the body
of another human is known as the “cyranoid method”
(see Figure 1). The social psychologist Milgram (1992), who
developed this method, trained people to speech shadow (i.e.,
replicate the words of a remote source via a covert audio-
relay apparatus), thus enabling them to them ventriloquize other
people’s speech while engaging in face-to-face interactions with
third parties. Inspired by Cyrano de Bergerac, Milgram referred
to the resulting hybrids as “cyranoids.” When naïve to their
interlocutor’s hybrid nature, third parties reliably succumbed to
what Milgram called the “cyranic illusion,” namely, the failure to
perceive that the words of a dialog partner are not self-authored.
KEY CONCEPT 3 | Speech shadowing
Speech shadowing entails a “speech shadower” repeating verbatim words
produced by a “speech source” (usually another person) as instantaneously
as possible. With practice shadowers can track the speech source with a
latency of about 250 ms, about the duration of a syllable (Marslen-Wilson,
1973). Speech shadowing imitates source words more accurately than people
reading transcripts of the shadowed words (Shockley et al., 2004).
KEY CONCEPT 4 | Cyranoid
A cyranoid, first proposed by Milgram (1992), is a human body that covertly
receives and repeats in real-time (speech shadow) words originating from
another human. Cyranoids are hybrids, combining the body of one person
with the speech of another. People who interact with a cyranoid, known as
“interactants,” tend not to notice that the body that speaks does not author the
words being spoken (see cyranic illusion).
The cyranic illusion’s robustness is due in large part to
the nature of speech shadowing. A proficient shadower is
KEY CONCEPT 5 | Cyranic illusion
The cyranic illusion, identified byMilgram (1992), refers to the finding that people
interacting with cyranoids tend not to notice that the body they are ostensibly
speaking to is not authoring the words being spoken. The cyranic illusion has
been shown to hold for large discrepancies between the cognition source and
the speaking body, such as a child speaking the words of an adult.
able to repeat unrehearsed individual words as they are being
spoken with only a few hundred ms of delay (Marslen-Wilson,
1973; Bailly, 2003), creating the appearance that one is speaking
spontaneous self-authored words. Once this level of skill is
achieved, shadowing requires minimal cognitive effort and
the shadower can divert their attention to mimicking body
language appropriate to the communicative scenario. We have
orchestrated several hundred cyranoid interactions, and our
expert shadowers report that cyranic conversations can be carried
out with ease for long durations as they don’t have to think about
what to say.
Milgram died before he could carry out the research
he envisioned and failed to produce a journal article
detailing his use of cyranoids. The method lay dormant
until we carried out the first systematic experiments on the
robustness of the method (Corti and Gillespie, 2015b). Our
first study compared cyranoid interactions with non-cyranoid
interactions. Forty participants engaged in unscripted, face-
to-face, dyadic discussions with an adult confederate who
was either communicating autonomously (control condition)
or shadowing the words of a remote adult source (cyranoid
condition). Analysis of videos of these 10-minute interactions,
debrief interviews, and post-interaction questionnaires
demonstrated that the conditions were comparable from
the point-of-view of the naïve participants (i.e., those in the
cyranoid condition failed to detect that their interlocutor
was a cyranoid), thus providing evidence for the cyranic
illusion.
FIGURE 1 | Combining a speech source and a speech shadower to produce a cyranoid.
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Our second study examined whether the cyranic illusion
would hold if there were a stark incongruence between the
speech source and the shadowing body. Seventy-two participants
naïve to the cyranoid method were randomly assigned to small
groups tasked with interviewing a confederate face-to-face for
20min. The confederate was either: an autonomous 12-year-old
boy, an autonomous 37-year-old university professor, a cyranoid
composed of the boy speech shadowing for the professor, or a
cyranoid composed of the professor speech shadowing for the
boy. Again, video analysis of the interactions, debrief interviews,
and post-interaction questionnaires showed that the cyranic
illusion still held; participants believed they were interacting with
an autonomous person despite incongruities between the body
they saw and the words they heard. Futhermore, we were able
to show how participants interacted differently with the same
speech source (child or professor) depending on the body that
spoke (Corti and Gillespie, 2015b).
Echoborgs
Taking the cyranoid methodology one step further, we combined
speech shadowers with chat bots in order to create “echoborgs”:
hybrid entities consisting of a human body paired to an
artificial speech source (Corti and Gillespie, 2015a; for a video
demonstration of the method, see Corti and Gillespie, 2015c).
Our echoborg research was born out of a motivation to push
the limits of the cyranic illusion. We found that echoborgs could
“pass” as autonomous humans when conversing face-to-face with
naïve interactants for 10min. The caveat is that participants
tended to see the echoborgs as either having a personality
disorder (e.g., social anxiety) or as acting in some way (albeit
spontaneously authoring their own words). These peculiarities
cannot be attributed to the medium (a human body that speaks),
but rather are due to the idiosyncrasies of the speech source (our
studies primarily made use of the chat bot Cleverbot; Carpenter,
2015).
KEY CONCEPT 6 | Echoborg
An echoborg is a human that covertly receives and repeats in real-time (speech
shadow) words originating from an artificial speech source. Corti and Gillespie
(2015a), the developers of the echoborg method, demonstrated that people
interacting with an echoborg fail to detect that the speech source is artificial
(see cyranic illusion). Echoborgs can be used to assess how people interact
with artificial speech sources when they firmly believe that they are engaged in
a human-human interaction.
The echoborg methodology is an inversion of the tele-
operated and Wizard of Oz techniques. Whereas the tele-
operated paradigm within android science has been used
largely as a means of circumventing the bottlenecks in artificial
intelligence (Nishio et al., 2007b), the echoborg paradigm makes
the reverse trade-off: privileging absolute bodily realism over
human-level speech and cognitive sophistication. Likewise, as
the Wizard of Oz technique is intended to prime research
participants to believe that they are interacting with a fully
autonomous agent when in fact the agent is being operated by
a human, the echoborg method generates the illusion that one is
interacting with an autonomous person as opposed to an agent in
control of the words spoken by a human body. Though we have
yet to attempt creating such a hybrid, we imagine future echoborg
research might include the agent giving behavioral cues to the
speech shadower, thus extending the agent’s influence within an
echoborg beyond mere word authorship.
We argue that the echoborg method is currently the only
means of examining human-agent interaction under the full
social psychological conditions of human-human interaction,
an affordance which grants researchers the ability to investigate
how a fleshy human body fundamentally alters the experience of
interacting with artificial intelligence and to what extent a real
human body is necessary in order to elicit certain patterns of
human communication. To support this claim, we investigated
the phenomenon of conversational repair using echoborgs and
less anthropomorphic mediums (Corti and Gillespie, 2016; for
an overview of conversational repair, see Schegloff, 1992). We
found that people more frequently initiate verbal repairs of
misunderstandings when they encounter a human-bodied agent-
interlocutor (vs. a screen-based agent-interlocutor) as well as
when they believe they are speaking to an autonomous human
(vs. an agent), and most frequently initiate repairs when both
of these conditions are met. In other words, people exerted the
most “intersubjective effort” toward establishing conversational
common ground when they interacted with a human body that
they believed was an autonomous human (when, in fact, the
speech source was always an agent).
Echoborg methodology can thus be operationalized to
test human-agent intersubjectivity against human-human
benchmarks. Human-agent interaction researchers have argued
that “the goal of human-agent interaction [...] should not be a
believable agent; it should be a believable interaction between
a human and agent in a given context” (Cassell and Tartaro,
2007, p. 407). In other words, what really counts in human-agent
interaction, insofar as the agent has been designed to mimic
the conversational sociality of a human, is not so much the
stand-alone cognitive sophistication or aesthetic quality of the
agent, but rather its ability to scaffold a quality of intersubjectivity
with its human user that is indistinguishable from that seen
in mundane human-human interaction. Since, as we have
shown (Corti and Gillespie, 2016), the fleshy human body (and
the associated belief that the mind is human) elicits complex
intersubjective behaviors from human interactants to a greater
degree than that elicited by non-human mediums, the echoborg
method can be used to test how various agents perform when
human-level intersubjectivity is expected from users. The more
successful conversational agents will be those that can achieve
and maintain a fluid, non-domain-specific conversation with a
human interactant in a context wherein the interactant, by virtue
of their believing they are interacting with another human mind,
assumes human-level intersubjectivity. The echoborg method
can create such contexts by-way-of placing a real human body in
front of the human interactant.
Methodological and Conceptual Caution
with Cyranoids and Echoborgs
While the possibilities for recombining bodies and speech
sources to form cyranoids and echoborgs are exciting,
methodological and conceptual caution is required. There
is always an element of latency with speech shadowing, and this
is most evident with echoborgs, whose speech latency is largely
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a function of both the means by which an interlocutor’s words
are imputed into the chat bot and the apparatus that relays the
chat bot’s words to the shadower (see Corti and Gillespie, 2015a).
Such delays can have unstable communicative significance.
For example, a delay preceding a thoughtful utterance has a
different social significance than a delay in participating in
joint laughter. Though speech shadowers reflexively imitate
the emotive and gestural elements (e.g., intonation, tone,
emphasis) of their source’s vocal delivery to a certain degree (a
phenomenon known as “phonetic convergence”; Pardo et al.,
2013), a shadower’s ability to replicate the full suite of vocal
gestures generated by their source is naturally limited. Thus,
while the semantic and syntactic content is fully provided by the
speech source, some of the speech style and all of the source’s
nonverbal behaviors (e.g., eye gaze, facial expression, gestures,
posture) are provided by the shadower (unless, as stated above,
the source provides the shadower with certain behavioral cues).
Without appropriate controls and a well-practiced shadower,
the nonverbal communication of a cyranoid or echoborg can
be at odds with the words provided by the source, creating an
unintentionally inauthentic persona. These practical challenges
can also make interpreting experimental results difficult. It
is important to remember that cyranoids and echoborgs are
hybrids and should not be thought of as a singular nervous
system (or artificial agent) in complete control of a body. Rather,
cyranoids and echoborgs are two or more separate nervous
systems (or agents) combining to control different components
of a seemingly singular social persona.
THE HUMAN BODY IN COMMUNICATION:
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
While studies examining tele-operated robots and androids, fully
autonomous robots and androids, avatars, and intelligent virtual
agents consistently reveal the significance of the visible body,
it is only with the cyranoid and echoborg methods that fleshy
human bodies are used as mediums for various speech sources.
Thus, it is only with these two methods that we can parse the
intersubjective processes uniquely elicited by conversing with a
real human body.
Descartes’ (1641/1985) over-sharp separation between the
body and cognition has been repeatedly undermined by empirical
research showing that cognition is, in many subtle ways,
inextricably bound to the body (Damasio, 2006) and evolutionary
processes (McKeown, 2013). But, Descartes’ second error, to
neglect the importance of social interaction for real-time
dynamics of cognition (Gillespie, 2006), remains widespread
(Farr, 1996). Even in the embodied cognition research paradigm
(which champions the importance of the body), the body for
the other is usually overlooked (Schilbach et al., 2013). Although
the body is undoubtedly the fleshy underpinning of cognition,
it is also the visible marker of a cognition source to other
people; it is the medium through which people engage with
that cognition source and in doing so attribute consciousness to
that cognition source (Graziano, 2013). In this sense, the body
shapes the perception of the mind because it is the gateway to the
mind (Biocca, 1997). The cyranoid and echoborg methodologies
are not useful for understanding the direct links between the
body and cognition, however they are uniquely powerful for
understanding how the body, as a medium of communication,
mediates cognition.
Face-to-face interaction between two people needs to be
conceptualized on at least three levels identified by Ichheiser
(1949a, p. 59) in his “framework of images in human relations.”
At the first level is what each person thinks about themselves.
At the second level is what each person thinks about the other
person. Finally, at the third level is what each party assumes
that the other thinks about them. Although this framework can
be extended to higher levels of complexity, additional levels
are difficult to address methodologically (Gillespie and Cornish,
2010). Table 2 maps this three-level framework onto research
questions operationalized using the cyranoid and echoborg
methods.
Level 1: Self-Perception and Identification
The first level concerns how the body contributes to self-
perception. Longstanding theory (e.g., Mead, 1913) and research
(e.g., Bem, 1972) suggests that a key component of selfhood is
self-perception. That is to say, we don’t only know ourselves from
the inside, we also observe ourselves from the outside in the same
way that we observe others. This raises the question: if people
observe themselves in a different body, might they start to think
and behave differently?
This question has been examined using avatars in virtual
environments. As reviewed above, this research has found that
people do indeed seem to behave in a way that conforms to
the body of their avatar (Yee and Bailenson, 2007) and that
being in the virtual body of another can facilitate identification
with people who routinely live in a given body type (Yee and
Bailenson, 2006). Using the cyranoid methodology, research
could try to replicate these findings in fleshy face-to-face
interactions. Although it would be technically challenging to
TABLE 2 | A conceptual framework for studying the body that speaks.
Level Conceptualization Research questions
1 Self’s perspective on self How does the source’s perception of their new body mediate their cognition, action and understanding of
other people with similar bodies?
2 Other’s perspective on self How does the interactant’s perception of the body that speaks mediate their understanding of what is said?
3 Self’s perspective on other’s perspective on self How does the source pick up on, conform to or react against the interactant’s expectations about the body
that speaks?
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 September 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1300
Gillespie and Corti The Body That Speaks
blind the shadower to the condition (avatars are blind by default),
the upshot would be convergent validity with even higher
mundane realism.
Level 2: The Cyranic Illusion, Impression
Formation, and Stereotyping
The second level focuses on the meaning of the body for
interactants, and specifically how it mediates their cognition and
behavior. Four main lines of research are evident at this level.
First, there is the phenomenon of the cyranic illusion. Our
research has shown that the illusion extends to a child body
speaking the words of a professor and to an adult body speaking
the words of a chat bot. This illusion, however, can be pushed
in other directions. Milgram (1992) himself wondered whether
a super-cyranoid could be created, with several sources (e.g.,
multiple human experts) providing suggestions to the shadower
who would be selective in using the assistance. Again, we
could ask: would interactants recognize the full nature of their
interlocutor’s speech source? Assistive technologies for cognition
are developing rapidly such that it might not be too long before
people routinely have access to in-ear cognitive support (O’Neill
and Gillespie, 2015). The cyranoid and echoborg methods could
enable research to get ahead of technological development
to examine how augmented humans would function and be
perceived in social settings. Another direction to push the cyranic
illusion would be to introduce familiarity as a variable: how long
would it take someone to notice either that an unfamiliar body
was shadowing their romantic partner, or, that their romantic
partner was shadowing an unfamiliar cognition source?We could
thus use the cyranoid method to parse the role of the body and
“mind” in close relationships.
Second, the cyranoid and echoborg methods can be
used to study the communicative significance of nonverbal
gestures in unscripted face-to-face conversation. Research on
nonverbal gestures has had to rely on naturalistic studies,
scripted interactions (e.g., Burgoon et al., 1984) or virtual
agents (Georgescu et al., 2014). If participants blind to the
condition or advanced chat bots were speech sources for human
speech shadowers who engaged, according to condition, in the
given nonverbal behavior (e.g., eye contact, posture, or facial
expression), then any variability between the conditions in either
the behavior of interactants or the impressions they reported
would be attributable to the gesture manipulation.
Third, the cyranoid and echoborg methods can be used to
study stereotyping based on body cues in unscripted face-to-face
conversations, providing powerful convergent validity to the
numerous studies that have activated stereotypes with priming
(e.g., Wheeler and Petty, 2001). Either participants blind
to the condition or advanced chat bots could be speech
sources for bodies differentiated by weight, height, skin
color, attractiveness, accent, gender, visible disability, or bodily
markings (e.g., piercings, tattoos and birthmarks). Again, the
differences perceived by interactants would be attributable
to the body that speaks, thus providing robust evidence
for the impact of stereotypes in unscripted face-to-face
interaction.
Finally, humans do not interact with artificial intelligence in
the same way that they interact with other humans. However,
it is difficult to identify the source of this difference. Do these
differences arise from limitations in the artificial intelligence
systems themselves? The Wizard of Oz paradigm can be used
to overcome the limitations of artificial intelligence, essentially
endowing mechanical or virtual bodies with human intelligence.
But, still the pattern of interaction is different. Is this because
the mechanical or virtual body triggers certain stereotypes
among human interactants? The most robust methodology for
examining how humans would interact with artificial intelligence
under the assumption that it is a human, we argue, is the
echoborg technique.
Level 3: Orienting to the Perspective of the
Other and Behavioral Confirmation
According to Ichheiser (1949b) one of the main biases in
social interaction is that people fail to see how they themselves
contribute to their own social environment; we don’t encounter
people “as they are,” rather, we meet them “as they respond to
us.” The unique social world that rises up to meet each of us
is furnished with other people’s expectations that are a function
of our bodies, dress, gestures, words, actions, reputation, and
social history. Moreover, Ichheiser (1949b, p. 29) observed that
we have a “tendency” to adjust our behavior to respond to, and
even conform to, these expectations that other people have of us;
thus further contributing to the peculiar social worlds that each
of us inhabit.
Since Ichheiser’s insightful suggestions, research has shown
that we do indeed have a tendency to conform to the expectations
others have of us, even at an unconscious level (Chen and Bargh,
1997). In a classic study Snyder et al. (1977) randomly assigned
men and women, who were strangers to each other, to have a
telephone conversation. The men were presented with a Polaroid
photograph of either an attractive or unattractive woman who
they were led to believe was their conversation partner. Blind
rating of the men’s utterances showed that the men who thought
they were conversing with attractive women were more sociable,
sexually warm, interesting, independent, sexually permissive,
bold, outgoing, humorous, and socially adept. Moreover, blind
rating of the women’s utterances (all the women were unaware of
the photographs) showed that the women whose male partners
had been led to believe they were attractive spoke with more
confidence, greater animation, greater enjoyment and greater
fondness of their conversation partner. Since this classic study,
however, it has been impossible to get closer to face-to-face
communication than a telephone call or some other distal form
of mediated interaction. Using the cyranoid methodology, with
speech sources blind to the peculiarity of the body that speaks
their words, the effect of behavioral confirmation could be
studied in unscripted face-to-face conversations.
What about the expectations that interaction partners might
have toward a mechanical body? People interacting with artificial
intelligence do less mentalizing (Chaminade et al., 2012) and
initiate fewer verbal repairs of misunderstanding (Corti and
Gillespie, 2016). Would a human speech source, blind to the
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mechanical body that they were speaking through, be able
to detect these lowered expectations? Instead of behavioral
confirmation (i.e., the speech source behaving more like a chat
bot), might there be resistance to these lowered expectations
(Jussim, 1990)? Maybe the speech source would attempt, at
an unconscious level, to demonstrate their humanity and
complexity. Or, perhaps humanity has to be seen in the body
(and thus be expected) in order to be given the space to flourish.
These unexplored research questions are made tractable by the
echoborg method.
CONCLUSION: THE BODY THAT SPEAKS
Information does not flow freely around the globe; each
micro-step entails reconstruction mediated by communication
processes (Habermas, 1981). Often these communication
processes relate to the peculiar dynamics of websites, television
programs, newspapers, books, and so on. But even in our mass
mediated world, the most important flows of information occur
face-to-face; family get-togethers, teaching, team meetings, job
interviews, salary negotiations, business transactions, corporate
mergers and international relations are all underpinned by
face-to-face meetings. Accordingly, despite the proliferation
of communication technologies (e.g., email, telephone, video
conferencing, avatars), human bodies are moved around the
globe at an unprecedented rate (Urry, 2012).
It is well established that individual cognition is grounded in
the body (Barsalou, 2008), but thinking in everyday life often
occurs between people in conversation (Schilbach et al., 2013;
Marková, 2016). At this more social point in the knowledge
construction process the body re-enters as particularly important,
not because it is the fleshy underpinning of cognition, but
because it is the medium that speaks. Our bodies are important
because they shape our self-perception, guide our perception and
expectations of others, and form the basis for the expectations
that others have of us and to which we orient and respond.
Some bodies have authority and voice, while other bodies are
ignored and not listened to—processes which feed-forward into
self-perceptions and reinforced expectations, thereby potentially
distorting knowledge construction (Habermas, 1970).
“The medium is the message,” McLuhan (1964, p. 9)
wrote, “because it is the medium that shapes and controls
the scale and form of human association and action.” The
body, as our primary medium, will always give precedence
to face-to-face communication: the meeting of bodies, our
primordial interaction, is the wellspring of social emotions and
trust (Marková and Gillespie, 2008). It is in this fleshy interface
that social meanings are made (Farr, 1997). Within this meaning-
making process the body is central, not as a speech source, but,
as a social cue. The speech source needs to combine with a
body to speak, and the impression made on the interlocutor is
a function both. Accordingly, it is not only the speech source that
communicates, but also the body that speaks.
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